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I. INTRODUCTION-THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
OVERT CONDUCT AND EXCLUSIONARY INTENT
Although the elements of the substantive crime of attempt to mon-
opolize under section 2 of the Sherman Act' have been many times
articulated, courts and legal scholars are still at odds concerning what
is actually required.2  Some of this confusion may be due to the fact
that until recently the elements of attempt have been subject to a lack
of analysis by both courts and legal scholars. Section 2 counts in com-
plaints have generally been afterthoughts in cases based primarily on
allegations of section 1 combinations and conspiracies. As such, any
resolution of the section 2 count was in the nature of an alternative
holding.'
4
The remaining controversy derives from the excessively ambig-
uous definition of the crime of attempt to monopolize, set forth by
Justice Holmes in the seminal case of Swift & Co. v. United States:5
* Member, California Bar. Mr. Hibner is a member of the firm of Sheppard, Mullin,
Richter & Hampton, Los Angeles, California.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1974) provides:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire
with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among several states, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and,
on conviction thereof shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a cor-
poration, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars or by imprisonment
not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the Court.
2. Compare, e.g., Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 2977 (1977) with George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 508 F.2d
547 (Ist Cir. 1974); Kraeger v. General Elec. Co., 497 F.2d 468, 471 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 861 (1974); Rea v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 577, 590 n.28 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
861 (1974); White Bag Co. v. Int'l Paper Co., [1974-2] TRADE RE. RE'. (CCH) 1 75,188 (4th
Cir. 1974); and Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969). See gen-
erally, Cooper, Attempts -and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Ansver to the Prophylac-
tic Riddle of Section Two, 72 MICH. L. Rav. 373 (1974); Hawk, Attempts to Monopolize-Specific
Intent as Antitrust's Ghost in the Machine, 58 CoRNEu.u L Rav. 1121 (1973); Hibner, Attempts
to Monopolize-A Concept In Search of Analysis, 34 ABA ANITRrusr L J. 165 (1967); Note,
Attempt to Monopolize Under the Sherman Act: Defendant's Market Power as a Requisite to a
Prima Facie Case, 73 COLuM. L. REv. 1451 (1973).
3. Hibner, supra note 2, at 165.
4. Compare Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 474, (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
993 (1964) with Cornwell Quality Tools Co. v. C.T.S. Co., 446 F.2d 825, 832 (9th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1045 (1972). Compare Hibner, supra note 2, with Blecher, Attempts to Monop-
olize Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 38 Gao. WASH. L REv. 552 (1969). See generally
Cooper, supra note 2, at 378; ABA SEcToN OF ANTrrgusT LAw, ANTrrRusr LAw DEvop-
mENTS 62 (1975)
5. L96 U.S. 375 (1905).
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
The statute [section 2] gives this proceeding against combinations in re-
straint of commerce among the States and against attempts to monopolize
the same. Intent is almost essential to such a combination, and is essen-
tial to such an attempt. Where acts are not sufficient in themselves to pro-
duce a result which the law seeks to prevent,-for instance, the monopoly-
but require further acts in addition to the mere forces of nature to bring
that result to pass, an intent to bring it to pass is necessary in order to pro-
duce a dangerous probability that it will happen. Commonwealth v.
Peaslee, 177 Massachusetts 267, 272. But when that intent and the con-
sequent dangerous probability exist, this statute, like many others, and
like the common law in some cases, directs itself against that dangerous
probability as well as against the completed result.6
Justice Holmes spoke of "intent" as being "essential to such an
attempt." Under his classic definition, when the defendant's act plus
"mere forces of nature" are not enough to bring about a proscribed re-
sult, "an intent to bring it to pass [is] necessary in order to produce a
dangerous probability that it will happen." This requisite intent to
prove a prima facie case is the specific intent to achieve the status of a
monopolist. As defined by one court in charging the jury, "[s]pecifie
intent means that the defendants must have done certain things with
monopoly as their objective, which, if successfully performed, could
result in actual monopolization. 7  Such a definition does little to
further the analysis. How must specific intent be shown under this in-
struction? Provided that substantial evidence of specific intent is
present, should the character or type of the "further acts" matter? Be-
cause of the difficulties in evaluating the subjective intent of a single
actor in a unilateral-as distinct from a concerted-attempt to monopo-
lize, should a certain threshold of proof be required?
It is perhaps not too surprising that neither the courts nor the com-
mentators have been helpful. If direct evidence exists, the inquiry is
simple enough. But antitrust defendants seldom provide explicit or at
least totally unambiguous evidence of specific intent.8 Accordingly,
juries are instructed that "specific intent" may be inferred from con-
temporaneous documents and from the history of the defendant's busi-
ness conduct. 9 As stated more recently by the Ninth Circuit, "all of the
acts should be viewed together in determining whether there was an
attempt to monopolize."'
6. Id. at 396.
7. United States v. Kansas City Star Co., No. 18444 (W.D. Mo. 1953), reprinted in ADA
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL ANTITRUST CASES 346 (1965).
8. See Blecher, Plaintiff's Viewpoint, Trial of an Antitrust Treble Damage Suit, 38 ADA
ANTITRUST L.J. 50, 54 (1968); Cooper, supra note 2, at 396.
9. See, e.g., Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 2977 (1977); Morning Pioneer, Inc. v. Bismark Tribune Co., 493 F.2d 383, 387 (8th
Cir. 1974); United States v. Jerrald Elec. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 567 (ED. Pa. 1960); Smith,
Attempt to Monopolize: Its Elements and Their Definitions, 2.7 Go. WASIL L. RLv. 227,
231-32 (1959).
10. Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 814 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
2977 (1977).
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It may be that attempting to infer specific intent from business
conduct is an exercise of questionable value. In many instances "spe-
cific intent" may be simply the label placed upon the conclusion that
the conduct under examination is sufficiently "wrong" to warrant pun-
ishment." What the courts seem to be doing is condemning conduct
that is sufficiently predatory. Once this is determined, the conclusion
of "specific intent" is sure to follow. Another way of describing the
same analysis is that if the conduct is sufficiently "bad," we should not
concern ourselves with the defendant's intent at all. We will punish,
by awarding damages to the plaintiff, any defendant who did what this
defendant did.' 2  Under this analysis "specific intent" and "dangerous
probability," the classic elements of attempt, are mirror images of each
other. In Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co.,13 the Ninth Circuit held that a
finding of "dangerous probability" could be based solely on proof of
specific intent to monopolize and did not require an analysis of market
power. This analysis has been rejected by most courts and commenta-
tors. 1 4  Nevertheless, if a specific intent is the dangerous probability,
and if the specific intent is inferable from anticompetitive acts, as
stated by the Ninth Circuit in Lessig,1s we would only be concerned
with the conduct itself. If the anticompetitive acts are sufficiently dis-
ruptive of competition in the market, the specific intent and the
dangerous probability will be found. Even in the other judicial cir-
cuits, in which a finding of dangerous probability requires an analysis
of market power, courts can be expected to find section 2 liability in
cases in which specific intent plainly exists through application of the
unstated rule that "the scope of the relevant market contracts and
expands in direct proportion to the viciousness of the overt acts al-
leged."' 6
The purpose of this paper is to assess the history, development, and
prognosis for a peculiar type of "overt act," namely the use of litigation
11. Cooper, supra note 2, at 397. See Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England,
Inc., 180 F. Supp. 125, 140 (D. Mass. 1959), modified, 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 833 (1961).
12. See United States v. Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 32, 39-41 (D. Minn. 1946).
13. 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
14. See cases cited note 2 supra, with exception of Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d
795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2977 (1977).
15. 327 F.2d at 474-75. See also Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2977 (1977). Lessig has been severely and universally criticized by courts
and commentators alike. See, e.g., Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d
790 (10th Cir. 1977); Morton Bldgs. of Neb., Inc. v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 531 F.2d 910, 919 (8th
Cir. 1976); Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338, 1348 (3d Cir. 1975); .I.
Delany Corp. v. Bonne Bell, Inc., 525 F.2d 296, 305-06 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 907 (1976); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc. 508 F.2d 547, 550
(1st Cir. 1974); Advance Business Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 425 F.2d 55 (4th Cir.
1969); United States v. IBM Corp., 66 F.R.D. 154, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Credit Bureau Reports,
Inc. v. Retail Co., 358 F. Supp. 780, 789 (S.D. Texas 1971), affld, 476 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. 1973);
Huron Valley Publishing Co. v. Booth Newspapers, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 659, 662 (E.D. Mich.
1972).
16. Hibner, supra note 2, at 168.
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in furtherance of a specific intent to monopolize. An analysis of the
stormy history of this type of case graphically illustrates the inherent
problems in reaching any single act or conduct under the attempts pro-
vision of section 2. Section 2 is less concerned with the quality of the
overt conduct than it is with the intent that may be inferred from that
conduct. Because evaluation of circumstantial evidence of intent
usually involves a Gestalt valuing of the totality of the business con-
duct of a number of actors over perhaps a period of years, it is difficult
to analyse any particular act in isolation.
An exception to this difficult problem of proof in attempt cases is
when evidence exists of hard core violations of section I of the Sherman
Act. 17  A number of cases have held that it is proper to infer a specific
intent to monopolize from section 1 violations, even if they are deemed
"technical." 18  Stated another way, when a combination or conspiracy
is involved, proof of specific intent "merges" with proof of the con-
spiracy or "concerted action" to drive competitors out of busness. 19
Courts may deem it unimportant in cases in which section 1 lia-
bility is present that additional "predatory" acts are present from
which specific intent may be inferred. 20  An equally plausible analysis,
however, is that if the overt acts give rise to per se illegality, it
would be incongruous for a court to then determine that the acts that
are per se exclusionary were not intended, in the attempt to monopolize
sense, to be exclusionary.
Because intent is inferable from the totality of the actor's business
conduct, and because virtually all cases involve a series of actions, fre-
quently of mixed character,21 the problem of positing the presence or
absence of specific intent to monopolize from individual overt acts is
difficult, for policy as well as practical or evidentiary reasons. Every
competitive act is exclusionary by its very nature;2 since if it were not
exclusionary it would be of doubtful competitive worth. Accordingly,
not every "exclusionary" act directed toward one's rivals should rise to
17. Considering the holding as grounded on a finding of section 1 violations is one way to
harmonize Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co. with adverse authority from the other circuits. See Knut-
son v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2977 (1977).
Knutson goes further, however, and states that predatory conduct, as opposed to section 1
illegality, coupled with specific intent, will suffice. Id. at 814.
18. See e.g., Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc. 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1976), Pert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 2977 (1977). The trial court found that while the defendant was guilty of price fixing,
there was no evidence of "predatory or knowingly unlawful activity." The Ninth Circuit re-
jected this approach, noting that price fixing has been illegal sin:e the Sherman Act was en-
acted.
19. United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 572-73 (2d Cir. 1961);
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, ANTn'Rusr DEVELOPMENTS 1955-1968 at 37 (1968).
20. Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2977
(1977).
21. See Cooper, supra note 2, at 446.
22. Id. at 435. See also Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England Inc., 180 F.
Supp. 125, 140 (D. Mass. 1959), modified, 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
833 (1961).
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the level of an antitrust violation. Businessmen must be encouraged to
compete, and should not be deterred from doing so because the legal
standards by which their conduct is to be judged are so loosely de-
fined.23
Perhaps an appropriate analogy is to prize fighting. While punch-
ing skills and agile footwork are much admired, a boxer will also be
encouraged to knock out his opponent. This end has been built into
the sport as a desirable one-one to be rewarded by victory. But kick-
ing, gouging, or hitting below the belt may result in the loss of a round,
or even the fight. In the market place we should not penalize a com-
petitor who through superior skill or even luck beats his rival into sub-
mission-so long as he plays by the rules.
2 4
It is the inherent vagueness of the rules that causes concern. Little
is added to the business lawyer's ability to predict the legal consequen-
ces of his client's business practices when courts conclude that courses
of conduct are proscribed because "predatory," "immoral," or "not
honestly industrial."25  Nevertheless, the courts have come forward
with little else that is more helpful. Mindful that specific intent may be
likened to hard-core pornography-that we will recognize it on sight-
the Ninth Circuit tells us that in determining guidelines for future con-
duct, "Part III [Attempts to Monopolize] is to be read with the remain-
der, and in light of the anticompetitive purposes and conduct to which
the case relates."
26
If the overt acts themselves support a finding of a section 1 viola-
tion, or if the "predatory" acts are numerous and sufficiently "dirty" or
"unfair," or even "not industrially honest," little damage probably re-
sults from such generality. Most cases will fit one of these categories.
Analogizing to Judge Learned Hand's famous tautology--"no monop-
olist monopolizes unconscious of what he is doing"27 -no attempted
monopolist attempts to monopolize specifically unconscious of what he
is doing. An analysis of the use of litigation as an overt act in further-
ance of an attempt to monopolize should impose liability if the overt
acts are carried out with design and are sufficiently predatory. In
the "clear" case of overwhelming evidence of the use of litigation as
an anticompetitive instrument of destruction, section 2 should be appli-
cable.28 If litigation is used as but one act in a series of clearly
23. Cf United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416,430 (2d Cir. 1945) ("'The
successful competitor, having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.").
24. Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1977).
25. See Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England Inc., 180 F. Supp. 125, 140
(D. Mass. 1959), modified, 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961).
26. Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459, 478 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993
(1964).
27. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 432 (1945).
28. See Blecher, Attempt to Monopolize Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act: "Dangerous
Probability" of Monopolization Within the "Relevant Market", 38 GEo. WASH. L REv. 215, 221
(1969); Cooper, supra note 2, at 377, 396.
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anticompetitive or "predatory" acts, section 2 may be applicable, par-
ticularly where the conduct of the litigation is unrelated to a legitimate
purpose of securing legal redress for a demonstrable wrong. In less
than clear cases, however, additional forces of public policy come into
play. These forces manifest themselves in the engrafting of addi-
tional requirements as prerequisites to the maintenance of an action.2"
Here, our analysis must begin.
II. THE THEORY OF LITIGATION AS A VIOLATION
OF THE SHERMAN ACT
A. Common Law Remedies for Abuse of Judicial or Administrative
Process
The development of legal theories to combat the use of litigation
as a means to injure another far predates the Sherman Act. Two tort
theories, malicious prosecution and abuse of process, evolved to allow
recovery when judicial or administrative process had been misused.
It must be recognized that these theories constitute exceptions to the
basic public policy encouraging the resolution of disputes through judi-
cial and administrative tribunals.30 To impose liability for the im-
proper use of litigation tends to undermine this policy and have a
chilling effect on the peaceful disposition of claims through litiga-
tion,31 particularly if the litigant's subjective intent is inferred from
circumstantial evidence. When litigation is the alleged wrongful act,
the courts have erected barriers to minimize any possible chilling
effect.32  These barriers range from outright immunity to higher de-
grees of required proof. Nevertheless, in clear cases of predatory con-
duct, recovery will be allowed, because if the litigation is clearly
improper, there can be no public policy in encouraging such conduct."i
Accordingly, the policy favoring access to the couirts to resolve disputes
in an orderly peaceful manner is far from absolute.3
4
29. See Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Exec. Bd. of
Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1571 (1977).
30. Note, Limiting the Antitrust Immunity For Concerted 4ttempts to Inftluence Courts,
and Adjudicatory Agencies: Analogies to Malicious Prosecution and Abuse of Process, 86 HARV.
L. REv. 715, 726 (1973). See Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416, 424 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952).
31. See Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Exec. Bd. of
Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 !;.Ct 1571 (1977).
32. See Note, supra note 30, at 729-30.
33. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 514 (1972); Metro
Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc., 516 F.2d 220, 228 (7th Cir. 1975); 6 CAL, Jvt', 3d
Assault and Other Willful Torts § 314 (1973). The current confused state of the law is well
illustrated in Vendo Co. v. Lectro-Vend Corp., 97 S. Ct. 2881 (1977). Seven members of the
Court are of the view that use of litigation may be actionable under the Sherman Act. Jumtice
Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger would require a "pattern of baseless, repetitive claims"
used as an anticompetition device. 97 S. Ct. 2894 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
34. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 514 (1972).
[Vol. 38:245
LITIGATION AS AN OVERT ACT
The tort theories of malicious prosecution and abuse of process are
instructive in evaluating the use of litigation as an overt act in further-
ance of an attempt to monopolize." If a person acts from malice
and institutes a groundless action against another, either civilly or crim-
inally, the injured person may bring an action for damages or malicious
prosecution. The plaintiff in such an action has the burden of proving
the favorable termination of the unjustifiable proceeding, malice, want
of probable cause, and lack of good faith on the part of the defendant.36
The element of malice adds little, since, like specific intent to monopo-
lize, it is inferable from the defendant's total course of conduct."
Abuse of process consists of the misuse or misapplication of legal
process subsequent to its issuance to accomplish some ulterior pur-
pose. The test of the tort of abuse is whether the process has been used
to accomplish some unlawful end, or to compel the defendant to per-
form collateral undertakings not legally required. As distinguished
from malicious prosecution, it is not required that the process be issued
maliciously or without cause. It is immaterial whether the process
abused resulted in a favorable termination, or even in a termination at
all.38 A typical example would be the use of litigation to collect a debt
not subject to the complaint. In an antitrust context, it could con-
sist of the use of litigation to enforce a threat that unless plaintiff
agrees not to compete the defendant will sue for unfair competition.39
B. Incorporation of Common Law Thought into National Antitrust
Policy
The rationale underlying both of these torts is illustrative of a na-
tional antitrust policy. The Supreme Court has stated on numerous
occasions that acts that would otherwise be lawful will lose that
character when they are committed as part of an illegal scheme.4
Common principles of the law of conspiracy teach that an overt act in
furtherance of a conspiracy is necessary before the substantive crime is
actionable. 41  The overt act itself, however, may be otherwise lawful.
35. See Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Tex.
1976); Note, supra note 30.
36. Stallings v. Foster, 119 CaL App. 2d 614, 259 P.2d 1006 (1953). See 6 CAL, Jut. 3d
Assault and Other Willful Torts § 311 (1976).
37. See W. PaossER, THE LAw OF TORiS § 119 at 841-47 (4th ed. 1971); Note, supra note
30, at 728; 32 CAL. Jmr 2d Malicious Prosecution § 36 (1956).
38. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 121 at 856 (4th ed. 1971); Note, supra note 30, at
732; 6 CAL. JuR. 3d Assault and Other Willful Torts §§ 8-19 (1976).
39. See Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Tex.
1976); Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 403 F. Supp. 527 (N.D. Ill. 1975), qffd 545 F.2d
1050 (7th Cir. 1976), rev'd on procedural grounds, 97 S. Ct. 2881 (1977).
40. See, e.g., California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 515
(1972); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690,707 (1962); American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946); Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396
(1905).
41. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347,387 (1912); United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 425
1977]
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These ideas are well recognized in antitrust cases. In American Tobac-
co Co. v. United States, Mr. Justice Burton stated:
It is not the form of the combination of the particular means used but the
result to be achieved that the statute condemns. It is not of importance
whether the means used to accomplish the unlawful objective are in them-
selves lawful or unlawful. Acts done to give effect to the conspiracy may
be in themselves wholly innocent acts. Yet, if they are part of the sum of
the acts which are relied upon to effectuate the conspiracy which the
statute forbids, they come within its prohibition.42
It is clear that this analysis is equally applicable to single actor
conduct as well, such as schemes designed to violate section 2. In the
classic case of United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,43 the court
held unlawful a series of otherwise permissible acts, that were used to
maintain monopoly power in the virgin aluminum ingot market. As
stated by the district court in Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States:
"While every person has the right to resort to the courts to redress
claimed wrongs, the right is not without limitation. One who enjoys
a monopoly may not resort to litigation for the purpose of illegally
maintaining the monopoly.
44
Thus, in theory, the use of litigation will be unlawful as an overt
act in furtherance of a scheme if the other elements of a section 2
crime are present. 45  As the legality of the otherwise lawful act will de-
pend on the presence of the other elements, the analogy of a section 2
offense involving litigation to the tort of abuse of process is probably
closer than to that of malicious prosecution. 46 If the litigation is unlaw-
fully motivated, it may not be dispositive that it is well founded, or even
meritorious. 7 However, as the facts underlying claims of abuse of
process and malicious prosecution often overlap,48 it would be unusual
in the real world to find many section 2 violations in which the sole
overt act is the use of meritorious litigation. Unless the evidence of
intent is independent of the course of conduct of the business-such as
a statement by an executive that he filed the action to put his competi-
F. Supp. 737, 738 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); Smith, Attempt to Monopofize: Its Elements and Their
Definitions, 27 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 227, 240 (1959).
42. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 309 (1946). See also United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 431-32 (2d Cir. 1945).
43. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
44. 331 F. Supp. 54, 62 (D. Minn. 1971), affld in part, vacated in part and remanded, 410
U.S. 366 (1973).
45. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 US, 172, 174 (1965),
46. See Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Tex.
1976).
47. See Rex Chainbelt, Inc. v. Harco Prods., Inc., 512 F.2d 993, 1005 (9th Cir. 1975);
Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952); Hand-
gards, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 69 F.R.D. 451 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
48. See Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 1088, 1096 (N.D.
Tex. 1976).
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tor out of business 49-the mere use of litigation would be unlikely to
compel an inference of specific intent. Almost all of the actions in
which plaintiffs have been successful have involved an integrated
course of conduct in which a series of predatory acts point in one direc-
tion-the exclusion of the plaintiff from the market." As we will see,
the presence of a series of overt acts, of which litigation was but one,
may be more than evidentiary.51
C. Judicial Recognition of Litigation as an Overt Act
in Violation of the Sherman Act
The Ninth Circuit has been one of the most active in recognizing
the use of litigation as an overt act in furtherance of an antitrust viola-
tion. In Lynch v. Magnavox Co., 52 the Ninth Circuit reversed the dis-
trict court, which had sustained a demurrer to a complaint alleging
violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Plaintiff alleged
that the defendants conspired to monopolize the manufacture, sale,
and distribution of radio loudspeakers. The conspiracy was to be
achieved by a pooling and cross-licensing of patents. The defendants
threatened to institute patent infringement actions to force radio re-
ceiving set manufacturers to discontinue the purchase of radio loud-
speakers from others, and to force the purchases of patent licenses,
thus allowing the defendants to control the prices for loudspeakers.
Defendants also allegedly engaged in a "ruinous commercial cam-
paign" to intimidate customers of nonmembers by instituting in-
fringment actions against key accounts. Finally, plaintiff alleged that
the infringement suits were not filed in good faith, "or in the honest
belief . . . as to the validity of" certain of the patents, "but were
overt acts committed by the defendants 'to effect the purposes of said
plan, scheme and conspiracy.' 253
Noting the "existing confusion as to the distinction between Sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the [Sherman] act, and what the elements under each
section are," the court held that the complaint stated a claim for an
attempt to monopolize by means of a conspiracy. Defendants' argu-
ment that the acts involved were all lawful-pooling patents, cross-licen-
sing, and threatening and bringing infringement suits-was rejected
by the court:
49. See Cooper, supra note 2, at 377.
50. See, e.g., Mach-Tronics Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1963); Kobe, Inc. v. Demp-
sey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837 (1952); Lynch v. Magnavox
Co., 94 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1938); Marnell v. United Parcel Sere. of America, 260 F.Supp. 391 (N.D.
Cal. 1971).
51. See Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Exec. Bd. of
Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 1571 (1977).
52. 94 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1938).
53. Id. at 887.
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We may assume that each of those acts would be lawful, and still a
conspiracy might be shown. If the agreement has an unlawful purpose,
it is a conspiracy, notwithstanding that the means used to carry it out were
lawful. Thus in Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396, 25 S. Ct.
276, 279, 49 L.Ed. 518, it is said "It is suggested that the several acts
charged are lawful, and that intent can make no difference. But they are
bound together as the parts of a single plan. The plan may make the
parts unlawful. 54
In Stewart-Warner Corp. v. Staley," the plaintiff moved to dismiss
an amended counterclaim that alleged a large number of patent viola-
tions of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The counterclaim al-
leged that plaintiff had acquired a large number of patents in the lub-
ricating equipment field, asserted the patents beyond their scope, paid
defendants in infringement actions not to defend themselves, falsely
marked its equipment under patents that were not applicable, and in-
stituted unwarranted suits for alleged infringement. In denying the
motions to dismiss, the court stated:
As to the charge against plaintiff of bringing unwarranted patent
suits, it is true that the plaintiff had a legal right to bring suits on patents
owned by it for alleged infringement. But where, as alleged in the amen-
ded counterclaim, such suits were brought without probable cause, that is
an element to consider in connection with the charges made by the defen-
dant of violation by plaintiff of the antitrust laws.
The same thing is true with reference to the circularization of court
decisions. The doing of that is not unlawful in itself, but may be con-
sidered in connection with the general plan charged against the plaintiff.
The same thing is true as to the alleged false marking of lubricating
equipment with inapplicable patent numbers. That is not of itself a
violation of the antitrust laws, but may be considered in connection with
the alleged conspiracy to violate those laws. 6
The cases support the proposition that if the purpose is unlawful, it is
immaterial that each of the individual acts, if viewed in isolation,
would be lawful. The character of each of the act; will be evaluated in
light of the whole. 57 Although the court in Stewart- Warner did not
articulate how the bringing of a suit without probable cause is to be
evaluated as "an element to consider," it is relatively clear that each of
the acts, including the use of litigation, is circumstantial evidence
bearing on the presence or absence of the elements of the substantive
crime.
While Stewart- Warner may contain a hint of the tort of malicious
54. Id. at 889.
55. 42 F. Supp. 140 (W.D. Pa. 1941).
56. Id. at 146.
57. Knutson v Daily Review, Inc., 548 F.2d 795, 814 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. dcnkcdl. Q7
S. Ct. 2977 (1977); Morning Pioneer, Inc. v. Bismark Tribune Co., 493 F.2d 383. 387 (8th Cir.
1974).
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prosecution, Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co.5 is more analogous to
abuse of process. In Kobe, the plaintiff was the owner of a number of
patents relating to hydraulic oil well pumps. Defendant Dempsey de-
veloped a competing pump. Without having any information about the
Dempsey pump other than seeing it at a trade exposition, Kobe sued for
infringement. Dempsey had offered to disclose the detailed structure
of the pump, but no examination was made. Dempsey filed a counter-
claim alleging abuse of the patent monopoly in violation of the Sherman
Act. The trial court found that certain of the patents sued on were valid
and infringed, and that Kobe had not instituted the suit in bad faith. It
believed its patents were infringed and intended to secure a judgment
that would eliminate Dempsey as a competitor. 9 Nevertheless, the
court held that Kobe was in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act,
and that the use of litigation was in furtherance of its monopolistic
practices.
The court of appeals affirmed noting that Kobe had no evidence of
infringement when the suit was brought, and had not availed itself of
an opportunity to examine the Dempsey pump.60 Kobe argued that
any damages suffered by Dempsey resulted only from the infringement
action, and that allowing damages to be recovered would be a denial
of free access to the courts. The court rejected the argument and
stated:
We fully recognize that free and unrestricted access to the courts should
not be denied or imperiled in any manner. At the same time we must not
permit the courts to be a vehicle for maintaining and carrying out an
unlawful monopoly which has for its purpose the elimination and preven-
tion of competition....
We have no doubt that if there was nothing more than the bringing of
the infringement action, resulting damages could not be recovered, but
that is not the case. The facts hereinbefore detailed are sufficient to sup-
port a finding that although Kobe believed some of its patents were in-
fringed, tje el u ose of the infringement action and the incidental ac-
tivities of Kobe's representatives was to further the existing monopoly
and to eliminate Dempsey as a competitor. The infringement action and
the related activities, of course, in themselves were not unlawful, and
standing alone would not be sufficient to sustain a claim for damages
which they may have caused, but when considered with the entire monop-
olistic scheme which preceded them we think, as the trial court did, that
they may be considered as having been done to give effect to the unlaw-
ful scheme. . . . To hold that there was no liability for damages caused
by this conduct, though lawful in itself, would permit a monopolizer to
smother every potential competitor with litigation before it had the op-
portunity to be otherwise caught in its tenacles and leave the competitor
without a remedy. 61
58. 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, -4 U.S. 837 (1952).
59. Id. at 424.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 424-25.
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The Kobe analysis is similar to the tort of abuse of process in that even
where probable cause existed, the purpose of the suit-to eliminate a
competitor-was improper.
A similar case is Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli.63 There, the defen-
dant initiated a state court action alleging theft of trade secrets. Plain-
tiff filed a federal antitrust action alleging that defendant had con-
spired to monopolize the video-tape recorder industry. Among the acts
alleged were the filing of the trade secret lawsuit and representations to
potential customers and suppliers that the litigation had already been
concluded in favor of defendant. Defendant moved to stay all proceed-
ings in the antitrust action pending a determination of the state court
trade secret action. The order was granted, and the plaintiff petitioned
for mandamus. In ordering that the writ issue, the Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit stated:
We do not see any way in which the respondent could avoid coming
to grips with the contentions made in the treble damage complaint that
the action was brought in the state court for the purpose of giving effect
to Ampex's unlawful monopolistic scheme. Even if it were to be found
that Mach-Tronics and its employees have been guilty of stealing the se-
crets and processes of Ampex, that would not avoid or otherwise dispose
of Mach-Tronics' treble damage case if the latter succeeds in establishing
these allegations of its complaint.
In this respect the case is very similar to Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey
Pump Co., 10 Cir. 198 F.2d 416.64
According to the court, whether the state court action was meritor-
ious was not dispositive. Judge Duniway in dissent questioned
whether it could be determined that the state court action was "base-
less" without first trying the state case.6 5  Not considered by either the
majority or the minority was the now famous Noerr6 issue. Although
it was unclear until California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlim-
ited67 whether the policy of encouraging access to the courts was pro-
62. While theory may dictate that acts legal in themselves will become unlawful if taken
to maintain monopoly power, the courts have been troubled when no "unfair" or predatory
conduct is present. The courts have held that lawfully acquired monopoly power maintained
by active under-pricing and dynamic but lawful business acumen does not constitute unlawful
monopolization. See Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423
U.S. 802 (1975); American Football League v. National Football League, 323 F.2d 124, 131 (4th
Cir. 1963). See also Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F,2d 582 (1st
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961). In light of Telex and Pacific Eng'r & Prod.
Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1977)L t is questionable how much vitality re-
mains in Kobi.)
63. 316 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1963).
64. Id. at 830.
65. Id. at 836. Judge Duniway, who dissented in Mach-Tronics, wrote the majority decision
in Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Culinary Workers,
542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1571 (1977).
66. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Irc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961). The
Noerr doctrine is fully discussed in section IliA infra.
67. 404 U.S. 508 (1972). The Ninth Circuit, relying on Walker Process Equip., Inc, v.
Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965), had held that Noerr immunity was not appll.
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tected by the first amendment, it is surprising that the issue was not
raised in Mach-Tronics. As we will see, the subsequent history of the
use of litigation as an act in furtherance of an attempt to monopolize is
totally enmeshed in what Noerr and its progeny may mean, through
balancing of the interests of access to the courts, the resolution of dis-
putes by peaceful means, and national antitrust policy. When the
conduct in question moves away from political activity and approaches
adjudicative activity the interests to be accommodated will also shift.
III. ANTITRUST POLICY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
There is without question a degree of natural tension between the
right of the people to petition the government and national antitrust
policy.6 8 While antitrust policy is a creature of the Congress, the right
to petition is constitutionally mandated 9  Until recently, however, the
right to petition was not considered applicable to the use of litigation in
furtherance of an antitrust violation.70
A. The Development of the Noerr Doctrine
Perhaps one of the most widely discussed and most perplexing
antitrust cases of recent memory is Eastern Railroad Presidents Con-
ference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc.71 Noerr involved a suit by forty-
one truck operators against twenty-four railroads, an association of rail-
road presidents, and a public relations firm for conspiracy to restrain
trade in and monopolize the long-distance freight business in violation
of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The railroads had hired the
public relations firm to conduct a publicity campaign against long-haul
truckers that would encourage the adoption and retention of laws that
would injure and restrict the truckers. The complaint alleged that the
sole motivation was to destroy truckers as competitors in the long-haul
freight business and that the railroads had attempted to influence legis-
lation by means of the publicity campaign, including persuading the
Governor of Pennsylvania to veto the "Fair Trucking Bill." The defen-
dants counterclaimed, alleging that the truckers had violated the Sher-
man Act by their own publicity campaign. The trial court held that the
railroads' publicity campaign violated the Sherman Act while that of
cable to judicial and administrative proceedings. See Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor
Transp. Co., 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970), aff'd, 404 U S. 508 (1972).
68. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961);
Note, supra note 30, at 723-24.
69. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging... the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. Co.sr. amend. 1.
70. See Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transp. Co., 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970),
af'd, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
71. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
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the truckers did not.72 The court disclaimed any purpose to condemn
as illegal mere efforts to influence legislation or law enforcement. The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the judgment of the dis-
trict court, stating that there was sufficient evidence to support the
findings. 3
A unanimous Supreme Court reversed. Justice Black, writing for
the Court, expressed concern over the impairment of the power of gov-
ernment to take action through its "legislature and executive.
' 74
He stated that the viability of the whole concept of representation in a
democracy depended on the ability of the people to make their wishes
known to their representatives, and that the Sherman Act was designed
to regulate business activity, not political activity. Finding the consti-
tutional right to petition to be of equal significance to the Sherman
Act, the Court held that the Sherman Act does not apply to activities
that comprise mere solicitation of governmental action with respect
to the passage and enforcement of laws. The "publicity campaign,"
although conducted with the sole purpose to destroy the truckers, was
insufficient to transform conduct otherwise lawful into a violation of the
Sherman Act. Justice Black stated that "[tlhe right of the people to
inform their representatives in government of their desires with respect
to the passage or enforcement of laws cannot properly be made to de-
pend upon their intent in doing so."
75
Of critical importance in understanding the implications of Noerr
is the fact that no activities were alleged that were unrelated to the
atten-pts to induce governmental action. The Court made it clear that
intent was irrelevant if the only activity complained of was seeking to
damage the truckers through influencing the le;-islation. Justice Black
noted: "There are no specific findings that the railroads attempted
directly to persuade anyone not to deal with the truckers. More-
over, all of the evidence in the record, both oral and documentary, deals
with the railroads' efforts to influence the passage and enforcement of
laws."76  Thus, unlike Kobe7 and Mach- Tronics,7S there was no evi-
dence of overt acts external to the complained-of activity. Noerr is con-
sistent with the Kobe court's statement: "[W]e have no doubt that if
there was nothing more than the bringing of the infringement action,
resulting damages could not be recovered, but that is not the case.""
72. 155 F. Supp. 768 (E.D. Pa. 1957) and 166 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Pa. 1958). a(f'd, 273 F.2d
218 (3rd Cir. 1959), rev'd, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
73. 273 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1959), rev'd, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
74. 365 U.S. 127, 137 (1961).
75. Id. at 139.
76. Id. at 142.
77. Kobe, Inc. v. Dempsey Pump Co., 198 F.2d 416 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 837
(1952).
78. Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1963).
79. 198 F.2d at 425.
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In addition to requiring external acts before the total conduct
would be subject to the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court in Noerr ex-
pressed a significant caveat that has become known as the "sham
exception":
There may be situations in which a publicity campaign, ostensibly
directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere sham to cover
what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with
the business relationships of a competitor and the application of the Sher-
man Act would be justified. But this certainly is not the case here. No
one denies that the railroads were making a genuine effort to influence
legislation and law enforcement practices."
It is unclear whether the "sham exception" includes the "external
acts" exceptions, or whether they are analytically different. Certainly,
evidence of attempting to injure a competitor by securing refusals to
deal, or by disparagement, would be probative in determining whether
resort to government action was "nothing more than an attempt to
interfere directly with the business relationships of a competitor."8
But if acts are involved, in addition to governmental action, that
bear greater "resemblance to the combinations normally held violative
of the Sherman Act,"82 the conduct should not be Noerr-protected be-
cause we would be dealing with business activity rather than "mere"
political activity.83 We should not need to consider whether the "sham
exception" is applicable. Again we are in an area where conduct and
the intent inferable from conduct are almost analytically indistinguish-
able.
Two years later, another case involving litigation as part of an
overall scheme to monopolize was before the Supreme Court. In
United States v. Singer Manufacturing Co.,84 Singer and two foreign
competitors utilized patent infringement actions and proceedings be-
fore the United States Tariff Commission as part of an overall scheme
to eliminate Japanese competition. No mention was made of Noerr,
therefore it would seem to have been reasonable to assume that Noerr
immunity did not relate to other than legislative activity.
In 1965 the Noerr exemption from antitrust liability was signifi-
cantly expanded in United Mine Workers v. Pennington." In Pen-
nington, a trustee of a union welfare and retirement fund sued a coal
80. 365 U.S. at 144. According to the Ninth Circuit, the "sham exception" does not pertain
to attempts to lobby and petition a governmental body. Such activities are absolutely immune.
The "sham exception" is limited to publicity campaigns. See Franchise Realty Interstate Corp.
v. San Francisco Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Culinary workers, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 97 S.Ct. 1571 (1977).
81. 365 U.S. at 144.
82. Id. at 136.
83. Id. at 138.
84. 374 U.S. 174 (1963).
85. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
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company for failure to make royalty payments. The defendant cross-
claimed against the union for violations of the Sherman Act. The
cross-claim alleged that the United Mine Workers and several large
coal operators had conspired to eliminate small operators by various
means, including approaching the Secretary of Labor to set a higher
minimum wage for employees of contractors selling coal to the TVA.
This would make it more difficult for small companies to compete in the
TVA term-contract market. Plaintiff was successful in a jury trial, and
the verdict was affirmed on appeal.86 The Supreme Court reversed and
remanded, stating that the lower courts had not taken proper account of
Noerr. Again the Court held that concerted attempts to influence pub-
lic officials were lawful regardless of purpose, overturning the approval
by the court of appeals of an instruction conditioning legality on proof
of illegal purpose. The Supreme Court stated: "Joint efforts to influ-
ence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even though inten-
ded to eliminate competition. Such conduct is not illegal, either stand-
ing alone or as part of a broader scheme itself iolative of the Sherman
Act. '87 At least in the political arena after Pennington, it was reason-
able to believe that attempts to influence public officials could not be
actionable under the Sherman Act even when the attempt was part of
an integrated scheme to eliminate competition. Pennington, however,
did not address itself to the "sham exception."
Within six months after deciding Pennington the Court decided
Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical
Corp.,"8 in which a defendant in a patent infringement suit filed a coun-
terclaim alleging that the plaintiff had violated section 2 of the Sherman
Act by suing on a patent obtained by fraud on the Patent Office. The
trial court granted a motion to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed on the ground that fraud on the Patent Office
could not be raised in an affirmative original action, but was limited to
use as an equitable defense.89 The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the enforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent Office
may be violative of section 2 of the Sherman Act, provided the other
elements are present. The alleged fraud was in testifying before the
Patent Office that it had no knowledge of prior public use. Neither
Noerr nor Pennington was mentioned, and no acts other than the ob-
taining and enforcement of the patent were alleged. While it cannot
be stated whether Noerr was ever considered, it is likely, from later
86. Pennington v. United Mine Workers, 325 F.2d 804 (6th Cir. 1963). rev'd, 381 U.S, 657
(1965).
87. 381 U.S. at 670 (emphasis added).
88. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
89. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp. v. Walker Process Equip. Inc., 335 F.2d 315 (7th Cir.
1964), rev'd, 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
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cases, that patent fraud through the use of false affidavits or testimony
would be within the "sham exception."9°
B. The Retreat from Noerr-Pennington: The Decision in Trucking
Unlimited.
The seeming inconsistency between Walker Process and Penning-
ton, decided only six months apart, caused the Ninth Circuit in Truck-
ing Unlimited v. California Motor Transport Co.91 to hold that the
Noerr-Pennington immunity was inapplicable to judicial proceedings.
Although affirming the Ninth Circuit opinion, the Supreme Court
held that Noerr was applicable to conduct before administrative and
judicial bodies. In so doing, however, the Court either severely limited
Pennington, or greatly expanded the "sham exception" of Noerr. By
its citations to Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,92
Walker Process,93 and Harman v. Valley National Bank,94 consider-
able insight concerning the intended breadth of the "sham exception"
was provided. It articulated a different standard for evaluating and
balancing first amendment standards, depending on the type of gov-
ernment action that is induced.
The complaint in Trucking Unlimited charged that various truck-
ing companies conspired to put the plaintiffs out of business by finan-
cing, carrying out, and publicizing a joint program of opposing, with
or without probable cause and regardless of the merits, virtually every
application for operating rights sought by the plaintiffs before the Cal-
ifornia Public Utilities Commission, the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, and the courts. In addition to the direct abuse of the judicial and
adjudicative processes of the commissions and the courts, the complaint
also alleged a series of external overt acts which, when combined with
adjudicative abuses, evidenced a broad-sweeping scheme to restrain
interstate trade. The additional external competitive acts included,
among other things, publicizing defendants' strategy to the trade in
order to cause others to cease dealing with the plaintiffs.
The district court dismissed the complaint, 95 and the court of
appeals reversed. 96 The Ninth Circuit held that the use of judicial and
administrative adjudicative processes as an integral part of a scheme to
restrain trade is not immunized under Noerr. The court concluded that
"litigation can be an integral part of a scheme prohibited by the Sher-
90. See California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512 (1972).
91. 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970), af'd, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
92. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
93. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp.. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
94. 339 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1964).
95. Trucking Unlimited v. California Motor Transp. Co., [1967] TRADE CAs. (CCH)
72,298 (N.D. Cal. 1967), revd, 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970), aftd, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
96. 432 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1970), aft'd, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
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man Act . .. and .. . that the Noerr-Pennington defense does not
bar relief when a conspracy to employ judicial and adjudicative pro-
cesses in a scheme to restrain trade is alleged. ' ' '7
The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the Trucking Unlimited
complaint fell within the intended ambit of Noerr's "sham exception."
Although the activities of the defendants were "ostensibly directed
toward influencing governmental action," 98 the Court concluded that
there was a denial of "free and unlimited access" to the adjudicative
agencies as a result of defendants' use of vexatious litigation. It is not
clear whether its finding of "a pattern of baseless, repetitive claims"''
is an essential ingredient to the Court's reasoning, or simply an expres-
sion of its holding as applied to the facts of the case. 00 Because of its
citation of Walker Process as an example of an abuse of the adjudica-
tive process, it is submitted that the "repetitive claims" language is
simply evidentiary. If the evidence is present from which the finder
of fact may conclude that the administrative and judicial processes have
been abused, liability may result, and Noerr is napplicable.
The Court recognized that difficult problems of proof may arise by
stating "[t]hat may be a difficult line to discern and draw. But once it
is drawn, the case is established that abuse of those processes produced
an illegal result."''°  In making it clear that Noerr is applicable to ad-
ministrative and judicial action, the Court drew a sharp distinction be-
tween the legislative and adjudicatory process. While unethical legis-
lative activity is within the Noerr immunity, adjudicatory conduct is
clearly subject to antitrust scrutiny. If the conduct is sufficiently "un-
ethical" or "reprehensible," it may constitute a sham, and not be im-
mune. In giving examples, the Court stated:
[U]nethical conduct in the setting of the adjudicatory process often results
in sanctions. Perjury of witnesses is one example. Use of a patent
obtained by fraud to exclude a competitor from the market may involve a
violation of the antitrust laws ...[citing Walker Process]. Conspir-
acy with a licensing authority to eliminate a competitor may also result
in an antitrust transgression. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide &
Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707; Harman v. Valley National Bank, 339
F.2d 564 (CA9 1964) ...
There are many other forms of illegal and reprehensible practice
which may corrupt the administrative or judicial processes and which may
result in antitrust violations. Misrepresentations, condoned in the politi-
cal arena, are not immunized when used in the adjudicatory process. 02
97. Id. at 760 (emphasis added).
98. Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc,, 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961).
99. California Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 513 (1972).
100. See the discussion of Vendo Co. v. Lectro-Vend Corp., 97 S. Ct., 2881 (1977) in
note 33 supra.
101. 404 U.S. at 513.
102. Id. at 512-13.
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The Supreme Court's citation to Continental Ore and Harman in
the above-quoted language may be an important key to understanding
the holding of Trucking Unlimited. The precise page cited from Con-
tinental Ore contains the following statement of law: "[I]t is well set-
tled that acts which are in themselves legal lose that character when
they become constituent elements of an unlawful scheme."'0 3  The
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in Harman that joint activ-
ity to influence governmental action is not immunized under Noerr if
the conduct is "but one element in a larger, long-continued scheme to
restrain and monopolize" trade.' °4 By reading Continental Ore and
Harman together with Trucking Unlimited, the proposition of law may
be stated as follows: Joint activity to influence adjudicative and judicial
bodies is not immunized under Noerr if the conduct is but one element
in a.larger scheme to restrain trade and unethical conduct is used
to abuse the adjudicatory process.
The exact reason why, however, is less than clear. The combined
activity is either outside the scope of Noerr, or subject to the "sham
exception." The overt acts external to the litigation may be probative
evidence of the "sham." Nevertheless, acts external to the litigation
should be completely unnecessary if the overall scheme or plan to
eliminate competition is present, and if misrepresentations, per-
jury, and withholding of material evidence are present in the litigation
itself. It is difficult to argue that first amendment rights exist to com-
mit frauds upon the judicial system in order to injure a competitor.
The problem may be similar to that experienced in the develop-
ment of the tort of abuse of process itself. Because of the possibility
that antitrust litigation may be used to discourage access to the courts
-on the theory that the prior litigation is a part of a scheme to violate
the antitrust laws-the action will tend to be disfavored. When external
acts abound from which illegal motivation maylos be inferred, however,
it is more likely that the antitrust suit is the sham, and the action may be
entertained as any other. As stated earlier, most fact situations will
involve independent anticompetitive acts external to the litigation. It
is not too likely therefore that meritorious claims of abuse of the judicial
process, without external acts as evidence of illegally exclusionary in-
tent, will be sent to early graves.10
6
103. Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707 (1962) (em-
phasis added).
104. Harman v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 339 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1964).
105. If litigation is the principal overt act alleged, a motion to dismiss may be proper.
Otherwise the "chilling effect" feared in Noerr will be effectuated by careful pleading. Franchise
Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d
1076 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 1571 (1977); Central Bank of Clayton v. Clayton
Bank, 424 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Mo. 1976); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 423 F. Supp. 913
(N.D. Cal. 1976).
106. The types of fears that may tend to engraft additional substantive elements into the
theory of recovery under the Sherman Act for the abuse of the judicial process to eliminate
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A year after Trucking Unlimited, the Supreme Court once again
had before it a monopolization case in which th- use of litigation was
one of the overt acts alleged. 10 7  As in Trucking Unlimited, it was re-
petitive lawsuits that provided the factual basis for the conclusion
that the use of litigation was within the sham exception.
The Otter Tail Power Company had engaged in a broad-sweeping
anticompetitive scheme involving, among other things, the use of litiga-
tion in state courts. The lawsuits had the effect of destroying poten-
tial competition from municipal power companies who needed a "no-
litigation certificate" in order to successfully raise capital through the
sale of revenue bonds. The district court found that Otter Tail had
violated section 2 of the Sherman Act by engaging in a series of anticom-
petitive acts including, in part, the institution of state court litigation.
The district court also held that Noerr immunity did not apply to abuses
of judicial processes.! 8 On direct appeal, the Supreme Court re-
manded the case for reconsideration in light of its intervening Truck-
ing Unlimited decision, but reaffirmed its position that, "[the sham ex-
ception] may also apply to the use of administrative or judicial pro-
cesses where the purpose to suppress competition is evidenced by
repetitive lawsuits carrying the hallmark of insubstantial claims and
thus is within the 'mere sham' exception announced in Noerr."'
10 9
The Court relied on Noerr without citation to Pennington. On
remand, the district court found that the litigation engaged in by Otter
Tail was within the sham exception of Noerr,"0 and the Supreme Court
affirmed without opinion."' Otter Tail is the last pronouncement by the
Supreme Court in this field." 2 It is noteworthy that Otter Tail also in-
volved "access barring" conduct, thus strengthening the argument
that the Trucking Unlimited'1 3 "sham exception" should be narrowly
competition are exemplified in Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint
Exec. Bd. of Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 1571 (1977).
Consistent with his dissent in Mach-Tronics, Judge Duniway expresses the view that the case of
pleading an antitrust claim may cause it to be used as a sword and not a shield. Compare 542
F.2d 1076, 1083 with Mach-Tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 836 (9th Cir. 1963) (Duniway, J.,
dissenting). In Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Codding, 423 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Cal. 1976), the court held
that to state a claim under the Trucking Unlimited exception, the complaint must allege specific
activities not protected under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine which have barred access to a gov-
ernmental agency. If the defendant is seeking official action, the activity is protected.
107. United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
108 United States v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54 (D. Minn. 1971), qff'd in
part, vacated in part, and remanded, 410 U.S. 366 (1973),
109 410 U.S. at 380.
110. 360 F. Supp. 451, 452 (D. Minn. 1973), aft'd, 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
111. 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
112. Since Vendo Co. v. Lectro-Vend Corp., 97 S. Ct. 2881 (1977), involved a reversal on
procedural grounds by a plurality opinion, the three opinions are dicta concerning the use of'
litigation. Seven members of the Court did not require repetitive suits as a prerequisite. No
mention was made of the term "access barring."
113. See Franchise Realty Interstate Corp. v. San Francisco Local Joint Exec. Bd. of
Culinary Workers, 542 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 1571 (1977); Central
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construed. The series of lawsuits involved in Otter Tail was designed
to produce the collateral result of preventing the marketing of the muni-
cipalities' revenue bonds. In this sense, meaningful access to the
courts was made futile, as the damage was already done by the filing of
the actions. From Otter Tail, as in Trucking Unlimited, it is clear that
the repetitive nature of the conduct is probative evidence of the abuse
of the judicial process. However, while a series of baseless lawsuits
may be evidence of monopolistic intent, it is not necessarily more pro-
bative of that intent than any number of acts related but external to
litigation. This has been the trend of a number of lower court decisions
subsequent to Trucking Unlimited' 4 that have not required that the
conduct involved be access barring. Illustrative of this trend is Asso-
ciated Radio Service Co. v. Page Airways, Inc.115 In Page, plaintiffs
alleged a conspiracy to eliminate them as competitors in the market
for avionic equipment in corporate and private aircraft. In furtherance
of the conspiracy defendants allegedly enticed employees away, de-
stroyed plaintiffs' records and documents, refused to pay a debt, sought
an ex parte injunction in a mechanic's lien action, and filed a spurious
interpleader action that slandered plaintiffs' credit. Defendants
moved to dismiss on a number of grounds including the Noerr-Penning-
ton doctrine. In denying the motion the court noted:
The critical distinction drawn by the Court in California Transport is be-
tween the concerted effort to influence public officials regardless of intent
and purpose and the concerted effort to abuse the judicial or administra-
tive process. . . . Those efforts to influence public officials are granted
immunity while those efforts to abuse the process are not. . .. The Court
concludes that the line between intent to influence and intent to abuse is
a difficult one to draw. . . . It is however, the drawing of that line which
must be done in this case." 6
Defendants argued that there can be no abuse of process within Truck-
ing Unlimited unless the state court action was maliciously prosecuted.
The court rejected this approach and stated that the gist of the Noerr
exception is abuse of process, not malicious prosecution. As such, the
Bank of Clayton v. Clayton Bank, 424 F. Supp. 163 (E.D. Mo. 1976); Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v.
Codding, 423 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
114. See, e.g., Metro Cable Co. v. CATV of Rockford, Inc. 516 F.2d 220,228 (7th Cir. 1975);
Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 509 F.2d 784 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 833 (1975); B.A.M. Liquors, Inc. v. Satenstein, 1976-2 TRADE CAS. 60,997 at
69,411-13 (S.D. Ill. 1976); Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 403 F. Supp. 527 (N.D. Ill.), qffd,
545 F.2d 1050 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd on procedural grounds, 97 S. Ct. 2881 (1977); Handgards.
Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson, 69 F.R.D. 451 (N.D. Cal. 1975); United States Dental Inst. V.
American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565, 581-83 (N.D. IlL 1975); Adolph Coors Co. v.
A&S Wholesalers, Inc., 1975-1 TRADE CAS. 60,187 at 65,633-34 (D. Colo. 1975); Cow Palace,
Ltd. v. Associated Milk Prod., Inc., 390 F. Supp. 696, 704 (D. Colo. 1975); Aloha Airlines v.
Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 1064, 1068 (D. Hawaii 1972). aft'd 489 F.2d 203 (9th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 913 (1974).
115. 414 F. Supp. 1088 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
116. Id. at 1096.
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court reasoned, the baselessness of the claim in the prior proceeding
was only one aspect of the various possible abuses of the legal process.
Accordingly, it was the purpose of achieving a collateral objective by
the prior litigation that was dispositive. The abuse of judicial process,
as discussed in Trucking Unlimited may take different forms. A series
of baseless lawsuits is only one of these forms. A single lawsuit,
coupled with pejury and collateral purpose, should also be sufficient.
But unless coupled with anticompetitive acts external to the litigation,
the courts are likely to dismiss the action no matter how careful the
pleader. Terms such as "sham" and "predatory," are at best conclu-
sions, and should be disregarded for this purpose.
117
The applicability of Noerr to certain types of privately induced
actions, however, has been placed in doubt in Cantor v. Detroit Edison
Co.t 18 The defendant, a private utility, furnished light bulbs without
charge to its residential customers. They were furnished under a long-
standing practice which antedated state regulation, although the prac-
tice was currently approved by the state. Plaintiff brought an action
claiming violation of the Sherman Act. The district court granted sum-
mary judgment," 9 citing Parker v. Brown 20 for the proposition that the
free light bulb program was exempt from state action. The court of
appeals affirmed.' 2 ' The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the doc-
trine of Parker v. Brown was inapplicable when a program with anti-
competitive effects was not central to the purposes of enabling legisla-
tion. It also held, however, that Noerr was inapplicable. The defendant
had argued that the program was also Noerr-protected because it in-
duced the state to approve its tariff. Mr. Justice Stevens in the ma-
jority opinion stated:
The holding in Noerr was that the concerted activities of the railroad de-
fendants in opposing legislation favorable to the plaintiff motor carriers
was not prohibited by the Sherman Act. The case did not involve any
question of either liability or exemption for private action taken in com-
pliance with state law. 22
Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting, noted: "The plurality's contrary view
would effectively overrule not only Parker but the entire body of post-
Parker case law in this area, including Noerr."
12
-
117. Hiland Dairy, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 402 F.2d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395
U.S. 961 (1969).
118. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
119. 392 F. Supp. I110 (E.D. Mich. 1974), aff'd, 513 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1975), reved, 428
U.S. 579 (1976).
120. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
121. 513 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
122. 428 U.S. at 601.
123. Id. at 625, (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Whatever the future holds for Noerr, the use of litigation as an
overt act in furtherance of an attempt to monopolize is likely to remain
as a viable theory of recovery when the judicial process is clearly
abused, and when anticompetitive external acts are present. This
is as it should be; in proper cases the Sherman Act is not likely to
have an in terrorum effect itself on access to courts or administrative
bodies. If anticompetitive overt acts in addition to litigation are
present, and particularly if per se section 1 allegations are involved,
the balancing of competing interests may even favor the maintenance
of the action. If the other elements of a section 2 case are present
there is no theoretical or policy impediment favoring the exemption
of litigation which in essence is an abuse of the judicial process, and
which is bound up as an integral part of a series of predatory acts.
Whatever Cantor may mean, it appears that Noerr is inapplicable
to privately induced legislative or adjudicatory action that would itself
be anticompetitive, and which is beyond the clear mandate of the legis-
lature or adjudicative body. Thus, it may be read as a narrow excep-
tion to Noerr, as is the "sham exception" itself.
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